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1 March 1979

TRANSLATIONS ON WESTERN EUROPE
(FOUO 14/79)

WEST

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FRANCE

POSITIONS OF VARIOUS PS 'CURRENTS' ANALYZED

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 30 Dec 78 pp 25-26

[Article by Franz-Olivier Giesbert: "Socialist Party: Inventory of a True Debate"]

[Text] Will the "war of the three" take place? On 6 January, in the big hall of the third underground floor of the national assembly, where the directive committee of the Socialist Party will hold its session, Francois Mitterrand, Pierre Mauroy, and Michel Rocard will know if they will truly become unstitched. Until then there is suspense. In any case, as a few weeks separate us from the Congress in Metz, the temperature is rising. This is the time of manifestos and polemics. The socialist leaders are tense as on the eve of combat. Yet, will they draw their swords from their scabbards? All of them are ready or, at least, so they say.

Believing in preserving his image of unifier, Pierre Mauroy keeps repeating that he has decided to achieve, at all costs, a synthesis of majority trends. This would work against some Rocard and Mitterrand supporters. "In any case," he said, sounding more ecumenical than ever, "a synthesis will be achieved, because the party wants it. If we act as collectively stupid in exposing our divisions, the Socialist Party could slip in a few months. Therefore, we must put an end to the dialectics of an internal divisiveness."

Yes, but how? Not necessarily by closing down the debate which is beginning today within the Socialist Party, for the play which is being staged in "France's first party" is, nevertheless, far more than a family affair. The political theater is such that all we see on the stage is the bouncing back of a settlement of accounts. Beyond that, however, basic questions are being decided concealed by too much excitement. It is in that area however, that the real debate should start. Its topics are quite well known.

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1. Break With Capitalism

Francois Mitterrand willingly speaks of a "break" and so do the "historical chiefs" of the CERES [Center for [Socialist] Studies, Research, and Education]. So does Gaston Defferre. Michel Rocard speaks of it almost never. Is he against it? No, he is for. However, he does not like the term, that is all. "With this matter," says Patrick Viveret, for the past 30 years one of the theoreticians of the Rocard team, "the practice of the forked tongue has reached its peak. This proves the extent to which the Mollet temptation threatens our party. With such kind of hollow formula one cannot prepare the party for real change." "Lenin," goes on to say the deputy from Yvelines, "took four years to break with capitalism. Therefore. . . ."

Therefore, the debate on the "break" is quite simply theological. Its evangelists, actually, are in great trouble the moment they try to define it. To some it is the "irreversible threshold" to be reached within the first 100 days of the future leftist government. To others it is the time when social relations among forces overturn. Like Pierre Mauroy, Gilles Martinet, or Dominique Taddei, Michel Rocard would rather speak of a "process." He believes that a country cannot be turned upside down suddenly, by adopting three laws and making three motions, replacing one system with another. Nor does Jean Poperen. A Mitterrand supporter, hardly suspected of supporting Rocard, the deputy from the Rhone says: "In history there has been no touch with a magic wand. No such thing has ever existed." He reminds us that our "bourgeois revolution--the 'classical' example of a revolution--took several decades."¹

2. The Market Economy

This is, above all, a semantic quarrel. Michel Rocard inaugurated it by promoting the virtues of the market. "Let us call a cat a cat," he said one day. "All experiments which have led to the disappearance of the risk and of economic penalties have consisted of building bureaucratic development models." His plan is clear: The economy must be guided, framed, and corrected; the market would do the rest. . . .

Francois Mitterrand shares that view. "Outside of any monopoly phenomenon," he stated two years ago, "the market economy will continue to dominate the development of French society. . . . It is not the purpose of the socialist experience to eliminate it." Yes, but the first secretary allowed, at that time, one of his lieutenants, Pierre Joxe, to accuse Michel Rocard of having spoken once of "global market control." Ah! Joxe is the most Marxist oriented and the least Rocardian, i.e., he belongs to the Mitterrand team. A plodder, he has the particular characteristic of being thoroughly familiar with his files. So is Rocard. A rather stormy competition developed between these two men within the Socialist Party, while Francois Mitterrand remained uninvolved.

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Yet, the first secretary easily supports today the predominance of the plan over the market. Yet, so do Mauroy and Rocard. Any possible breach would be between the Mitterrand-Mauroy-Rocard trio and the CERES which is more of a "planner" than all the others.

3. The State and Nationalizations

A graduate of the National Administration School and the Finance Inspectorate, and former secretary general of the Nation's Accounts Commission, Michel Rocard presents himself as the chief salesman of the state. Yet, he is the most anti-statist among the socialist leaders. One of his theme songs is, "the establishment of socialism in France does not go through the strengthening of our administrative apparatus, already omnipotent as it is." This was also said in May 1968. . . .

A super-regionalist yet less reticent in terms of nationalizations, Pierre Mauroy does not think of fighting the state. Nor does Francois Mitterrand. The first secretary of the Socialist Party, who considers nationalization one of the fundamental principles of socialism, opposes Rocard's "basism": "To think that the base could instinctively resolve the problems which a methodical organization alone could undertake would lead us into utopia." At CERES, hearing such "Girondist" statements by the deputy from Yvelines, the "historical chiefs" raise their arms: "Not to use the levers offered by the state would mean cutting one's own hands! If we do not take them over the state apparatus would turn against us!"

4. Economic Harshness

On this point as well Michel Rocard is quite alone. He emphasizes that, "the left must not promise more than it could keep." Before the elections Rocard opposed the Socialist Party leadership on the SMIC [Interoccupational Minimum Growth Wage] of 2,400 francs. Facing the Communist Party, he thought that the 2,000 franc level should have been supported--the initial socialist position. "Let us explain to the workers that, by skipping stages, we risk an inflation explosion. They would understand." Pressured by Pierre Mauroy, Francois Mitterrand finally decided in favor of the 2,400 franc SMIC. He does not regret it. "Had a leftist government been unable to set up a 2,400 franc SMIC in March 1978," he stated to LA CROIX, last Tuesday, "it would have meant that such a government would have been totally ineffective!"

The same applies to the last major socialist proposal: The 35-hour work week with no drop in wages. In this case, Michel Rocard believes that one should dare to lower the high salaries. Francois Mitterrand shrugs. In his case, unquestionably, politics is more important than economics. This applies to Rocard as well even though the latter adds smilingly: "Providing, however, that one is able to control it."

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5. International Politics

On the preceding matters Pierre Mauroy is ready to accept any kind of compromise. He stops short at international politics. He considers bending the European line followed by the Socialist Party out of the question. Socialism's future goes through Europe. Not a Europe as conceived by Giscard, naturally, but that of the "workers." Inevitably, the European social democrats will evolve. If criticized in his presence, the mayor of Lille always concludes by saying: "True, they make errors. Frequently they are too cautious. However, these are workers and they hold the power." Let the French socialists be warned. . . .

Michel Rocard is also a European. Both men share the view of Gille Martinet or Dominique Taddei that one must answer positively and immediately the call of the Italian Communist Party for tightening up relations among the European political left. They are horrified by the wave of chauvinism which is rolling today over France. Sometimes they ask themselves whether Francois Mitterrand has not lost his European fiber.

He has not. A European from the very first, Francois Mitterrand has always favored the development of the Common Market within the framework of the Treaty of Rome. He has always called for a "free France within an independent Europe." Yet, true, he has become quite cautious. He would rather let Giscard to extricate himself with "his own" type of Europe. The Socialist Party's formulation of the great European manifesto has been delayed. In parliament the socialists abstain in voting on European problems. Actually, Jean-Pierre Cot has been so affected by the "timidity" of his party when it concerns Europe that he has asked for a "clarification" meeting of the socialist group in the National Assembly. "If this goes on," he says, "we will end up nowhere." Indeed, everything has been clarified, and the Europeans within the Socialist Party have found themselves facing the combined assaults mounted by the Mitterrand-chosen people, the CERES or the . . . "wine growers." What worries the Europeans within the Socialist Party, in fact, is the ascendancy of what they describe as "the new nationalism" within the Mitterrand current, through Pierre Joxe, that same Joxe who holds today the position of the first secretary's great political coordinator.

However, it is probably in terms of the CERES that the anti-European ideology has scored the biggest number of points in recent months. The minority's contribution plan is greatly hindered by the dislike of a "German-American Europe." The "historical chiefs" of the CERES willingly state that France would be able to accomplish a revolution only through a nationalistic upsurge: They have no intention of letting the right accomplish this. All this is encompassed within an overall view of the world. The view is quite pessimistic. It is also very "authoritarian socialist." Thus, the CERES denounces the "anti-Vietnam" campaign launched by the leftist press: "Human rights are part of the debate on humanism, on the dominant ideology."² They are concerned with "the use of dissidence by imperialist ideology."

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6. Unification of the Left

Everyone favors it. Opinions diverge on the way to promote it. According to Pierre Mauroy, Michel Rocard, or Jean-Pierre Cot, a new policy must be formulated, along with a new substance of such a unification. Their thesis is the following: "The Socialist Party can no longer preach union with the Communist Party without an effort to intensify the discussion, limiting itself to violent criticism of the communist line. End to the wait-and-see attitude! No more a defensive union!" "We must heap questions on our partners," Gilles Martinet says. How? Well, the socialists will make the communists "evolve" by questioning Soviet reality, the world crisis, or else their contradictions between "social chauvinism" and proletarian internationalism.

Really? Neither Francois Mitterrand nor the CERES leadership believe this. The former would like to "keep up" with the Epinay Line while the latter would like to "return" to it. Yet, in their view, the ways to unity, long and tortuous though they might be, have not changed since 19 March. Here is the explanation of Gerard Delfau, one of the Mitterrand theoreticians, Paris-VII professor and mayor of a small community in the Herault: "In the final account, one of the two big parties will have to take over. We must first put the Communist Party in the position of accepting the experience of a leftist union, outside of which it would not avoid an electoral erosion. Then we must be able to withstand the shock with it in the various undertakings and associations. Such are our targets. Yet, it would be absurd to plunge into an ideological debate with the Communist Party."

7. The Party Concept

Pierre Mauroy and Michel Rocard dream of a great Socialist Party, less of an "electoral machine" and more popular and stronger in the factories. They willingly mention Francois Mitterrand's "presidentialism" and demand "more collegial action at all levels." On this point their positions are similar to those held by the CERES. However, to both Francois Mitterrand has the opportunity to mention the state of French socialism when he assumed leadership in the Socialist Party in 1971. "Remember those scattered, divided, worn out socialists, who had sunk to nothing."

So there. There are five big currents today within the Socialist Party: The Mitterrand group; the French style social democratic movement, favoring unity and decentralization, headed by Pierre Mauroy; Michel Rocard's self-management "Mendesism"; a new type of Marxism, free from the ideological twists of a Gilles Martinet or Christian Pierret; and the CERES "progressivism." None of these currents could govern the Socialist Party by itself. Therefore, anything could happen before the Metz Congress: All kinds of alliances and twists. Including the Mitterrand-Mauroy-Rocard synthesis.

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FOOTNOTES

1. See "Nous Sommes Tous Archaïques" [We are all Archaic] by Jean Poperen, Editions Roblot.
2. REPERES, November issue.

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FRANCE

LAURENT FABIOUS COMMENTS ON PS UNITY, ECONOMIC AUSTERITY

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 15-21 Jan 79 p 33

[Article by Laurent Fabius, deputy from Seine-Maritime, member of the management committee of the Socialist Party (PS) and associate of Francois Mitterrand]

[Text] When I found some 15 contributions from PS activists on my table, I was reminded of a remark made by Woody Allen. It provides a good introduction to our discussion: "The answer is 'yes'; but tell me again: what was the question?" Accordingly, in the current polemics, in which the party's interest is often neglected for the pleasure of a provocative statement, I suggest that we abandon ready-made answers and get back to a few simple questions.

1. Party unity is necessary. Without a doubt. But what is party unity?

In the first place party unity rests upon a certain number of points which, one could say, make up the Epinay line: unity of the Left, class front, self-management, nationalization, planning. One cannot really be a partisan of unity and question this premise. One cannot say that he agrees with group strategy and reject essential aspects of the program which accompanies it. One cannot proclaim his fidelity to the spirit of Epinay and speak of "autonomous action" of the PS. One cannot hope to extend socializations and to nationalize without transferring capital property. One cannot declare his attachment to the Plan and advocate maintenance of most of the present market operations. One cannot proclaim the international character of socialism and take pride in nationalist feelings.

To seek unity also means wanting to be militant together. How many socialists are today discouraged by the networks, bureaus and parallel finances being maintained by certain individuals who sing the praises everywhere of forthrightness, democracy and togetherness! How many new adherents drop out, disappointed after a few meetings, because they come to fight against the Right and find themselves thrust into vague procedural struggles between minor clan chieftains, constructors of sectarianism and destroyers of activism. Is not the desire for unity also a preference for the partisans of this unity over the proponents of divisionism?

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2. Economic stringency is necessary. Without a doubt. But what is economic stringency?

Is it a question of postponing socialism until the year 3000? Certainly not. On the other hand, is it a question of demanding everything immediately and for everyone? Not that either. One readily confuses economic stringency with social stringency. But Raymond Barre is not an economist of stringency; he is only an economist of the Right. Of course, there is evidence that no one can ignore today. We are no longer living in the 1960's, during which the necessary redistribution could have taken place on the surpluses alone of large growth. France, subjected to the "laws of the world market," has attained a degree of integration which renders any political independence more delicate and more necessary. That is true, even obvious, but it is part of the trappings of a diploma and not of economic stringency.

On the other side of the coin, a false, pseudoscientific idea is flourishing concerning economic stringency. The raising of the SMIC [inter-occupational minimum growth wage] to 2,400 francs (April 1978 level) would not be stringent because it is the shared opinion of Valery Giscard d'Estaing and Raymond Barre. The reducing of the work week to 35 hours also would not be stringent because Francois Ceyrac shares the opinion of these two men. It is a quick forgetfulness of the express conditions established precisely by the PS so that these measures, which were socially necessary, would be economically bearable: tightening the spectrum of revenues, aid to the manpower-using industries, progressiveness, negotiations, European harmonization. It is not in the formulating of these proposals that stringency is lacking. It is in the denying of the means and conditions for these proposals. For example, failure to take into account the facts of the world situation. Or better yet, doing without the essential tools such as credit control, a voluntarist Plan, extension of worker rights, a new fiscal deal. Economic stringency can be lacking because of dogmatism. It can also be lacking because of weakness.

3. The Socialist Party must take into consideration the stakes of the future. Without a doubt. But what are these stakes?

First, questions about the France of tomorrow: employment and the traumatized regions, independence, excessive inequalities, our entire country in the near future. Let us go farther. Are we not in the process of shifting the center of the world, from the Atlantic to the Pacific? What is the next stage after the fragile oil respite? What are the consequences of and the remedies for the demographic crises of the West? Are these not enough questions to mobilize our energies?

The future is also the upcoming elections. All socialists agree on the construction of another Europe; however, we must guard against drift. I am a little concerned when I observe that the leadership of our party has had submitted to it a draft of the European program of the Socialist Party which is totally unacceptable for the defense of French socialism because it is merely an import product. This concern seizes me again when, a little later, there

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is an effort to once more question a decision of the socialist group in the National Assembly, which had the audacity to vote against the government in order to signal an end to the sabotaging of the Assembly in the European TVA [value-added tax] matter. On the other hand, we must shun the other drift like the plague; i.e., the nationalist drift. Nationalism is in accordance with neither our economic nor our political interests, nor with the vocation of socialism. Is it not up to us to give our own answer: the Europe of the workers of the 35 hours, of the "Airbus," etc.?

I fully believe that the future will belong to those (no matter what their age" who share with me these feelings, these questions and these proposals. These individuals do not belong to any church and are not beholden to any fiefdom. They are socialists; that is all. And they want a great Socialist Party. This aspiration does not have the solidity of the cyclic alliance between old resentments and new ambitions. But it is fortunately, I think, in the majority in the PS.

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ITALY

MEMBERSHIP, STRUCTURE, FISCAL POLICY OF LABOR UNIONS

Milan IL SOLE-24 ORE in Italian 29, 31 Aug 78; 3, 20 Sep 78; 1, 11 Nov 78

[Article by Salvatore Coi: "Behind the Labor Union Scenes"; for related articles see JPRS L/8243, 25 January 1979 (FOUO 7/79) pp 18-25 and JPRS L/8274, 12 February 1979 (FOUO 11/79) pp 38-47]

[29 Aug 78, p 3]

[Text] Commonplaces, reticence, half-truths have surrounded the organizational aspects of Italian labor unions with mystery for a long time. And they still surround it to a considerable degree. In the recent past, ideological divisions, organizational weakness, financial problems have justified gross tampering with data or mere silence.

The picture of the situation has improved slightly in these last 3 years. In 1977, at the time of their congresses, the CGIL [Italian General Confederation of Labor], the CISL [Italian Confederation of Labor Unions] and, for the first time, also the UIL [Italian Union of Labor] disclosed figures on their own members. Previously, the CGIL and the CISL had published some figures on financing and on structure. These data are, however, either incomplete and full of gaps or very aggregate. For example, members of craft unions are computed in one single figure for all Italy.

In other countries, like Great Britain and Germany, labor union organizations make no mystery of their organizational activity. It is not understood why, in Italy, this is a matter reserved only for the persons in charge of the confederation organization bureaus. The investigation to be presented on these pages will examine three aspects primarily: the number of members in labor union organizations in the period from 1968 to 1976, the labor union structure, financing. Much of the data to be

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revealed in a study by Salvatore Coi that we are beginning to publish have not yet been reported by labor unions.

In 1976, there were 8,245,399 members enrolled in the three labor union confederations. This figure also includes 1,099,335 retired members who have a union membership card, although they are no longer active in the labor world. Therefore, in 1976, there were 7,146,064 workers enrolled as labor union members. The ratio between this last figure and the total number of wage-earning workers is the rate of unionization. In 1976, the rate of unionization in Italy was 51.2 percent. This figure is higher than the average figure in other European countries (in Germany it is 33 percent; in Great Britain, 52 percent; in France 25 percent). In comparison with 1968, the increase in enrolled members is very considerable: over 74 percent. In fact, in 1968, there were 4,170,000 members enrolled in the three labor union confederations (excluding retired members). The rate of unionization, only 33.6 percent, shows the weakness of labor union presence up to that time. It should be noted that these last-mentioned figures were revealed only between the end of 1974 and the end of 1975. The estimates provided previously by the labor unions were entirely different. In the period from 1968 to 1976, the increase in membership occurred constantly (8-9 percentage increase points each year), with the exception of 1973.

The strong expansion of Italian labor unions is tied first of all to the resumption of industrial conflicts at the end of the 1960's. The new cycle of struggles specifically involved industrial workers (metalworking and chemistry) in the north. In 1969, 216 million hours were lost in labor conflicts in northern Italy (71 percent of the total for Italy). In the industrial sector alone in that geographic area, 185 million hours were lost (61 percent of the total for Italy).

At the same time, there were 6,613,000 wage-earning workers in northern Italy, in 1969 (52.5 percent of the total for Italy), including 4,160,000 in the industrial sector. This last figure is 63 percent of the total number of workers in northern Italy and 33 percent of the total for the nation. In the years following 1969, conflicts were spread more uniformly (with the exception of 1973 because of contract renewals in industry) among the geographic areas and among the economic activity sectors.

The revival of conflicts enabled labor unions to strengthen their presence in factories considerably. In fact, in industry, the rate of unionization increased from 25 percent, in 1968, to 49.5 percent, in 1976. This last figure is very close to, but still below, the national average figure for the rate of unionization (51.2 percent). The hot autumn also naturally involves the other sectors of labor unionism. The grievance drive accompanying these struggles and reflected also in the political world, enabled labor unionism to pick up members and followers in the sector of services, agriculture and public office. The South was also involved in this process of labor union change and growth.

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Light should be thrown on a very important aspect of labor union growth. In the period from 1968 to 1976, labor union membership increased almost identically in each of the three confederations. In 1976, CGIL members increased 75.4 percent in comparison with 1968; CISL members, 74.1 percent and UIL members, 70.4 percent. This parallel growth in membership in the three confederations left the strength relationship unchanged within them. In fact, in 1968, the CGIL had 52 percent of the total number of members; the CISL, 34.7 percent; the UIL, 13.7 percent. In 1976, the situation was unchanged. The figures are, respectively, 52.4 percent, 34.2 percent and 13.4 percent. The CGIL still has an absolute majority of the number of members in comparison with the other two organizations. The internal compactness of the CGIL has been strengthening its position subsequently and has actually been putting it in a situation of "relative hegemony" with regard to the CISL and the UIL.

A question comes up spontaneously, when the equilibrium existing between the confederated organizations are mentioned and the figures presented above are known. Is the stability of the size ratio between the confederations in the period from 1968 to 1976 an accidental stability or a "controlled" stability? In other words, is this equilibrium of forces the natural continuation of an equilibrium already in existence since 1961, or is it the result of the new course, characterized by the interconfederation agreement on "freezing" the debate on organic unity, on mechanisms governing representation of the confederations in the Unified Federation?

An unconvincing answer is that the cause of this equilibrium is the decline of the ideological motivation that had driven a worker, up to then, to join one labor union rather than another. Anyone who has followed labor union vicissitudes in recent years knows that this has not happened, even in the most unified craft federations. Instead, it is more likely that the CGIL, the CISL and the UIL have operated, in order to maintain a certain degree of equilibrium of forces within each one. The plan for labor union unity always takes this fact into account. The problem, rather, is so deeply felt that often recourse has to be had to not very orthodox methods of election and cooptation for forming the council of delegates (the basic unified structure of the labor union in places of work in whose election all wage-earning workers may participate with their vote, regardless of whether or not they are members of the union). Every effort is made to guarantee the satisfactory presence of each of the three confederations within this body.

Labor unionism itself recognizes the existence of these methods and denounces the more serious cases. Aldo Amoretti, national secretary of the FILTEA [Italian Federation of Workers in Carpentry, Construction and Related Industries]-CGIL and a member of the confederation organization bureau, describes the situation as follows: "It ranges from the direct appointment of organizations not subject to control by the assembly or the council to situations in which first the delegate to be elected has been specified and then the homogenous group suitable for that purpose.

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This matter becomes worse when it goes from the council to the executive committee. In this respect, the most serious phenomenon is not, actually, reproduction of the federative mechanism, that is to say the establishment of a joint executive committee. Actually, the truly serious situations occur when this takes place under the table, going so far as to give rise to secret voting with predetermined results."

Then, in addition to the interconfederation relations, there are problems of relationship between the various political party trends within each individual confederation. Keeping this complex equilibrium of forces alive requires a considerable expenditure of energy by Italian labor unionism.

Wage-earning Workers (in thousands) and Union Members by Confederation.
Data for All Italy

Year	Wage-earning workers	CGIL	Union Members: Absolute Data CISL	UIL	TOTAL
1968	12,396	2,461,297	1,622,158	648,393	4,731,848
1972	12,988	3,214,827	2,184,279	842,912	6,242,018
1973	13,239	3,435,405	2,214,199	901,916	6,551,520
1974	13,620	3,830,175	2,472,701	965,051	7,267,927
1975	13,802	4,081,480	2,593,544	1,032,605	7,707,629
1976	13,955	4,316,699	2,823,812	1,104,888	8,245,399

Sources: ISTAT [Central Statistics Institute] (Labor Statistics Yearbook) CGIL, CISL. The 1976 UIL data were furnished by the UIL itself. The rest of the data were worked up by us.

[31 Aug 78, p 3]

[Text] The considerable increase in membership by the three labor union confederations involved every economic activity sector and every geographic area. But not uniformly. A detailed examination of the data makes it possible to show the factors affecting this expansion.

First of all, political tradition, degrees of conflict, economic structure, scant original presence of labor unionism. In 1976, there were 4,268,881 members enrolled in the three confederations in northern Italy. Retired union members are also included in these figures. There are no separate data for them, with the exception of CGIL members. Therefore, the rate of unionization turns out to be overestimated. This rate is 59.4 percent in northern Italy (the national rate, including retired members, is 59.1 percent). In northern Italy, the CGIL has 2,392,773 members; the CISL, 1,395,469; the UIL, 480,639. The percentage ratios are 57 percent, 31 percent, 12 percent, respectively. These figures show that the greatest weight goes to the CGIL, also with regard to the national average.

The high number of wage-earning workers in the industrial sector and the presence of the PCI are strength factors for the CGIL. It is interesting

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to note that the regions administered by the Communist Party have very high unionization rates. Naturally, the largest contribution to the formation of this rate was provided by the CGIL. In other words, there is a direct relation between the voting force of the Communist Party and the presence of the above-mentioned confederation. Take, for example, Emilia-Romagna. There, in 1976, there were 1,041,549 union members (96.4 percent of the wage-earning workers), 755,227 (73 percent) of whom are CGIL members. As we shall see, a similar situation occurs in Tuscany.

The situation in the northern regions administered by the Christian Democratic Party (Veneto, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Trentino-Alto Adige) is quite different. In these regions, which have, however, a good degree of industrialization, the CGIL not only does not maintain the levels attained in other regions, but it is definitely surpassed by the CISL. The rate of unionization itself is much lower than the national average. In Veneto, there are 600,159 union members (56 percent of the wage-earning workers). Of these, there are only 252,745 (42 percent) enrolled in the CGIL, while the CISL has 288,602 (48 percent). It should be noted that the economic structure in Veneto is not substantially different from the one in Emilia-Romagna. Therefore, there is a close relationship between political tradition and labor union presence. With an important characteristic: the communist tradition is accompanied by a very high labor union participation, much higher than what is true of the Catholic tradition.

The opinion is widespread that Italian labor unionism has the largest number of members in the more industrialized areas. Now, although it is true that labor unionism in the north has much higher levels of organization and activity than the rest of Italy, it is not equally true that a higher rate of labor union membership by wage-earning workers is recorded in that area. This does not occur in Piedmont, the most industrialized region, where the rate of unionization is fixed at 43 percent, one of the absolutely lowest rates, and it does not occur in Lombardy, where the level of unionization is higher (56 percent) but still below the national average. A high degree of participation in strikes, in the industrial sector, has only a partial influence on the choice of union membership. As further proof of this, in 1968, that is to say before the outbreak of conflicts in industry, the rate of unionization in Lombardy (36 percent) was higher than the national average (34 percent).

The narrow relationship between industrialization and degrees of unionization (in the two regions examined the relation seems definitely to be the reverse) is also proved by a rapid parallel between regions with a different degree of industrialization. The largest number of members is recorded precisely in the less industrialized regions. For example, the rate of unionization in Veneto is 56 percent. In Friuli-Venezia Giulia it is 59 percent.

Moreover, the national rate of unionization in industry itself is lower than in public administration and in agriculture. In northern Italy, the

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percentage increase in union members in the period from 1968 to 1976 is 62 percent, much lower than the national average increase owing to the high initial presence in the Red regions (Emilia Romagna and Liguria) and owing to the small percentage incidence in Piedmont.

In central Italy, there were 1,574,152 labor union members, in 1976, 58.6 percent of the total number of workers. The number is distributed as follows among the three confederations: CGIL, 920,032 (58 percent); CISL, 453,181 (29 percent); UIL, 200,939 (13 percent).

Tuscany is the most interesting point in this geographic area. In that region, dominated by the PCI, the remarks made on ideological motivations of labor union membership are exactly confirmed. The dominant presence of the CGIL is confirmed there, with 70 percent of the union members and a rate of unionization of 67 percent, a rate abundantly above the national average, is recorded. The most evident confirmation is furnished us, however, by Lucca Province, the only province in Tuscany administered by the DC [Christian Democratic Party]. The percentage participation in the CGIL out of the total number of organized union members is 48 percent, while the CISL, which has 22 percent in Tuscany, comes out here with 40 percent.

Although the degrees of conflict showed a definite increase in central Italy, starting in 1969, they are still within the physiological limits, especially if sight is not lost of the situation in the north. Greater fragmentation of the production situation and a lack of the serious social problems peculiar to the industrial areas in the north have made labor conflicts less severe.

When we go on to examine the South, the first thing noted is the distortion in the strength relations between the confederation organizations. In 1976, of the 2,401,784 union members (58.8 percent of the wage-earning workers) the CGIL had 1,003,312 (41.8 percent); the CISL, 975,162 (40.6 percent); the UIL, 423,310 (17.6 percent). A first explanation of these figures is the South's economic structure. In fact, that is where 73 percent of the national total of the wage-earning workers in agriculture, 21.7 percent of the wage-earning workers in industry and 30 percent of the wage-earning workers in services and in public administration are concentrated. Of the total number of wage-earning workers in the South, 20 percent are employed in agriculture; 38 percent, in industry; 42 percent in services and public administration.

The weight of the bureaucratic structure favors, in the South, the action of the CISL and the UIL, organizations traditionally more suited for picking up the consensus of the middle classes and also owing to their relations with the Christian Democratic Party and the lay parties. Rather, the activity of the CGIL is often tied to the membership of the party with a relative majority in the South. The CGIL, which, in the last few years, has succeeded in doubling the number of its own members and in strengthening its structures, is undergoing the initiative of the CISL.

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The closed attitude of many craft federations and a practice of corporative grievances are still preventing the establishment of new labor union structures and renovation and reform action.

The high rate of percentage increase in 1976 in comparison with 1968 -- plus 130 percent for the CGIL and plus 108 percent for the CISL -- is certainly explained also by the increase in participation in political activity and labor union action, in addition to the initial small labor union presence. Therefore, the gap with regard to the North is still very pronounced. Ideological dualism (Catholic tradition of the CISL and communist tradition of the CGIL), geographic dualism (strong participation in labor union activity in the North and survival of the old bureaucratic structures in the South), social dualism (worker labor unions and middle-class labor unions) are the structural facts of Italian labor unionism, often suppressed and ignored.

Wage-earning Workers (in thousands) and Union Members by Confederation.
Data broken down by large geographic distribution

Southern and Insular Italy (Molise, Abruzzi, Campania, Puglie, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicily, Sardinia)

Year	Union Members: Absolute Data				
	Wage-earning workers	CGIL	CISL	UIL	TOTAL
1968	3,622	435,491	469,470		
1972	3,753	615,750	656,743		
1973	3,823	672,960	660,498		
1974	3,969	845,305	804,426		
1975	4,024	929,268	861,368	330,719	2,121,265
1976	4,084	1,003,312	975,162	423,310	2,401,784

Sources: ISTAT (Labor Statistics Yearbook); CGIL, CISL, UIL.

[3 Sep 78, p 3]

[Text] Confederated labor unionism is present in agriculture both among farmworkers (wage-earning workers) and among sharecroppers and tenant farmers (self-employed workers). The data furnished by the confederations deserve special attention. As Table 1 shows, in 1976 there were 1,165,021 farmworkers enrolled as members of confederations, a figure higher than the figure furnished by ISTAT, still in 1976, for the total number of wage-earning workers in agriculture. The three labor union confederations justify this phenomenon by maintaining that part of those computed by ISTAT among self-employed workers (tenant farmers, assistants, sharecroppers) are also members of the farmworker federations. The indiscriminate classification of self-employed workers in fact makes it difficult to make a definite classification among wage-earning workers or among self-employed workers. In case of doubt, the confederations, primarily the CGIL, prefer to organize part of the farmers in farmworker federations. The reason is obvious. Among the farmworkers, the labor union can count

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on almost unanimity of membership and on a good organizational level, especially after the agreement signed at the end of 1973 committing the INPS [National Social Security Institute] to make the labor union deduction by delegation. That is to say that a farmworker is not a member of the confederation organizations only if he explicitly refuses to pay labor union dues by declaring this on a specific form.

The picture changes completely among farmers. Of 1,800,000 farmers, CGIL, CISL, UIL have a little more than 200,000 card-carrying members, while the very great majority, around 80 percent of the farmers, belong to the COLDIRETTI [Confederation of Small Farmers], an organization that exists under the protection of the Christian Democratic Party and that rejects any kind of dialog with labor unions.

In spite of the desire to participate stated by the CGIL, CISL, UIL (in July 1977, on occasion of the congresses of the three organizations, the Farmers Alliance, a unified craft federation of farmers, held its constituent assembly), efforts in this field have been very limited. This is the fact that emerges from the figures on members of the FEDERMEZZADRI-CGIL [Sharecroppers Federation affiliated with the CGIL]. In 1968, the FEDERMEZZADRI had 220,173 members. This number decreased constantly, in subsequent years, to 71,072, in 1976, one-third of the original figure. It is obvious that what we have here is a shift into the stronger, organized FEDERBRACCIANTI-CGIL [Farmworkers Federation affiliated with the CGIL], rather than a loss of members.

Organizing in the farmworkers federations persons who are not farmworkers (tenant farmers, sharecroppers, leaseholders) is a sign of weakness and confusion within labor unionism. The interests that should be protected are, in fact, too heterogeneous to be able to restrict them to one single organization and to the field of a single policy line, unless ideological cement intervenes to blot out such obvious conflicts.

Seventy percent of the farmworkers are concentrated in the South, especially in Puglia and Sicily. In the South, the FEDERBRACCIANTI-CGIL and the FISBA [Italian Wage-earner and Farmworker Federation affiliated with the CISL] form 40 percent and 50 percent of the total number of members in the respective confederations. In many parts of this geographic area, they are the only labor union reality of any importance. On the other hand, the numerical weight and political influence in the North (Piedmont, Lombardy, Veneto), the only geographic area in Italy with an efficient agricultural structure, organized in accordance with capitalist criteria and with a good rate of employment of youth manpower, are slight. There, labor union activity in agriculture is completely obscured by the presence of industrial craft federations.

It should be noted that the numerical density of the FEDERBRACCIANTI-CGIL, FISBA-CISL and UISBA-UIL is not at all in agreement with an equal political weight within the respective confederations. In fact, although the craft

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federations are larger by far in number of members, they exercise very little political influence on the confederation level. The "Southern" policy itself of the labor union organizations is determined primarily by the industrial labor unions and much less by the unions that carry on their activity in the South, like the farmworker federations, precisely. The causes of this situation are to be sought especially in the extreme fragmentation of agricultural economy in the South and in the resultant difficulty for labor unions to intervene. The above-mentioned agreement with the INPS, an agreement sanctioned by law in December 1973 guaranteeing labor unions an automatic collection of the deduction by delegation, has remedied this problem in part. Nevertheless, the organizational problems connected with the dispersion of the active population in this sector and with job instability are still serious.

But the first cause of the anomalous relationship existing between confederations and farmworker unions is to be sought in the slight amount of internal renovation in the farmworker unions. We find the two original inspirations of Italian labor union activity preserved in the FEDERMEZZADRI-CGIL and in the FISBA-CISL, especially in the South, more than in any other craft union. The communist tradition tied to the seizure of land in the early 1950's and the Catholic tradition enclosed in an often obscurantist clerical atmosphere still find few points of agreement and almost no motive for common action in the South. The troubled history of the unified relations between the FEDERBRACCIANTI on the one hand and the FISBA and UISBA on the other is in fact very familiar. This trouble has deep roots in our country's rural situation, owing to the great influence had by each of the three federations especially among farmworkers.

The problem unsolved by these craft federations lies in the nonlabor-union connected motivations of their influence and activity. It is difficult to find points of convergence for common action within that situation, since, among other things, there is slight participation by the members in labor union activity. This last-mentioned phenomenon is not accidental but, rather, is tied directly to the organizational structures adopted to channel and feed influence on the members themselves. The endemic crisis of agriculture should induce these labor unions to seek firm points of unified participation and of common reflection.

The fact that the labor union organizations have vast followers in this area and do not succeed then in using this strength of theirs for promoting the sector's transformation and rationalization is serious. It is the only way for defending effectively the interests of the members themselves.

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Table 1: Wage-earning Workers (in thousands) and Labor Union Members by Confederation. Agriculture (Farmworkers)

Year	Wage-earning workers	Union Members: Absolute Data			TOTAL
		CGIL	CISL	UIL	
1968	1,332	368,138	191,675		
1972	1,226	401,700	213,321		
1973	1,212	407,513	215,534		
1974	1,189	517,257	331,368		
1975	1,130	555,632	374,609		
1976	1,147	590,275	415,632	159,114	1,165,021

Sources: Labor Statistics Yearbook, various years. CGIL, CISL, UIL.

Table 2: Wage-earning Workers (in thousands) and Labor union Members by Confederation. Agriculture (tenant farmers, sharecroppers)

	Wage-earning workers	Union Members: Absolute Data			TOTALE
		CGIL	CISL	UIL	
1968	2,841	220,173	77,898		
1972	2,072	124,746	83,045		
1973	1,980	86,511	84,738		
1974	1,922	82,625	89,183		
1975	1,834	79,048	66,432		
1976	1,782	71,072	74,521	59,486	205,079

Sources: Labor Statistics Yearbook, various years. CGIL, CISL, UIL.

[20 Sep 78, p 3]

[Text] In 1976, there were 3,242,497 members of craft federations belonging to the CGIL-CISL-UIL in industry. A short calculation, based on Table 1, below, gives us, for 1976, a 49.5-percent unionization rate. This percentage is very close to but lower than the overall rate of unionization (51.2 percent). It is useful to note that this figure of 49.5 percent was attained by means of an increase in membership amounting to 99.2 percent for the CGIL and 82.1 percent for the CISL, in comparison with 1968. These percentages are much higher than the respective national average increases (+75.4 percent for the CGIL, +74.1 percent for the CISL in the period from 1968 to 1976. These first figures throw light on an aspect of industrial labor unions in Italy that is not secondary. It is commonly believed that craft federations in industry, the only ones subjected to analysis and evaluation in our country, organize within them almost all wage-earning workers in the sector. These federations, which were the absolute protagonists in the hot autumn and the main authors of the political, organizational and institutional recovery of the entire labor union movement, reveal some lagging in proselytism. The increase in members in the period under examination is very high, but is still insufficient to put this sector of labor unionisms in line with the national average values for the rate of unionization.

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A rate of unionization lower than the average had already emerged from the data pertaining to some regions among the most industrialized regions in the North (Piedmont, Veneto). What are the causes of this phenomenon? Of course, the small size at first. In fact, in 1968, the rate of unionization in the industrial sector was slightly above 25 percent, with some branches (building, food purveying) around 20 percent. Surely, the structure of our system of production, characterized by a very large number of small and very small businesses within which labor unions find it difficult to act or do not act, has a bearing. It is true, however, that, in the agriculture sector, also full of very small-sized businesses, labor unionism solved the problem brilliantly, at least judging from the figures. Their figures are the motivation adopted most frequently for justifying the "anomalous" situation.

The basic cause for the relatively small number of members in the industrial labor unions is to be sought elsewhere. Especially in "politicalization," the dominant characteristic in the branches (semipublic, local institutions, hospital workers, to mention only a few). The vicissitudes are well known. In public administration, membership in a party or open expression of one's own liking for certain prominent individuals in the political world are indispensable factors for obtaining any employment. Once the job has been obtained, membership in a labor union -- one of the three (CGIL, CISL, UIL) -- is almost automatic. An example of the different method of labor union proselytism in industry and in public employment is offered to us by a branch of the industrial sector itself, the energy products branch (gas, water, electricity). In 1976, there were 150,395 labor union members in this branch, 80 percent of the wage-earning workers. These figures are characteristic of public administration together with the high rate of incidence by the CISL on the total (45.6 percent), a rate slightly higher than the rate for the CGIL (45.2 percent) itself. In spite of this high number of members (in 1968, the rate of unionization was already higher than 70 percent), it certainly cannot be stated that the labor unions involved in this branch made an appreciable contribution during the hot autumn and later. Moreover, it is difficult to find an economic activity branch more fragmented than this one. The wage-earning workers are scattered about 8,000 Italian communes.

This branch is placed by ISTAT in the industrial sector, because of national accounting exigencies. It should be placed more properly in public administration, from the labor union point of view, because the business involved here (municipal-owned businesses, ENEL [National Electric Power Agency] are public.

In the light of all that has been said, the gap between the figures in the various sectors of economic activity in Italy finds its explanation. The levels of unionization in industry are, therefore, to be entirely respected, because they have been obtained with a proselytism action based almost exclusively on a reasonable, sincere relationship between workers and labor unions, without other filters, at least without the ones operating in other

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sectors. The figures given in table 2, below, may be of assistance for further confirmation of this assumption. There, it can easily be observed that a respectable number of unified proxies are present only in industrial labor unions, in the Federation of Metalworkers in particular. A proxy is signed by a wage-earning worker for payment of the monthly dues to his own craft union. The deductions are made by the employer. The worker must indicate to which of the three craft unions belonging to the CGIL-CISL-UIL the dues paid by him go. Signing the proxy in favor of the unified craft union, without a confederation choice, is an act that expresses a desire for greater unity in labor union activity and greater autonomy with regard to the world of political parties. This desire is limited to the industrial sector. It is a desire fed by the establishment and presence of new bodies of labor union democracy within a company: the assembly and the council of delegates.

In 1976, there were 1,803,825 members of the CGIL in industry, 55.6 percent of the total number of members in confederated unionism in this sector; 997,487 (30.8 percent) CISL members and 441,180 (13.6) UIL members.

The CGIL percentage, higher than the average percentage of overall union membership (52.4 percent), is an indication of the consensus picked up by it among the ranks of the working class. Other data enhance this characteristic of the CGIL. In 1976, members of the confederated unions in the industrial sector, for example, amounted to 45.4 of the total number of members (excluding retired members): in the CGIL, membership in the industrial federations amounted to 50.7 percent; in the CISL, 39.3 percent; in the UIL, 41.9 percent. The worker presence in the CGIL, enhanced also by the weakness of the CISL in some branches of industry (building), emerges indeed from these figures in absolute terms and in internal percentage composition, with regard to the average values. However, the consensus picked up in industry does not at all make it possible to describe the CGIL, as has often been done, as a blue-collar worker confederation, and, on the other hand, the CISL and the UIL as confederations of the white collar working class. The ideological emphasis implicit in this distribution cannot be supported by any of the data pertaining to the social composition of the individual labor union organizations. In this connection, there still are no reliable figures for the industrial sector on degrees of unionization among the white-collar classes and the blue-collar classes. This is an important matter for evaluating the weight that the white-collar classes in the industrial sector have within the three different confederations.

This big gap makes it impossible, moreover, to evaluate, even only approximately, the presence of the labor union movement among the white-collar classes in industry. The urgent need for a greater coordination of data is also motivated by the constantly increasing percentage incidence of white-collar workers on the total number of wage-earning workers in the sector.

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The factors contributing to describing the organizational strength and the mobilization capability of the industrial labor unions cannot, naturally, be reduced to mere levels of unionization. However, this does not justify the indifference, and more frequently the diffidence, to which the issue is still subjected.

Table 1: Wage-earning Workers (in thousands) and Labor Union Members by Confederation. Industry.

Year	Wage-earning workers	Union Members: Absolute Data			
		CGIL	CISL	UIL	TOTAL
1968		905,749	547,727		
1972	6,454	1,497,560	837,074		
1973	6,495	1,558,286	856,149		
1974	6,603	1,698,964	900,611		
1975	6,569	1,746,264	926,941	351,754	3,024,959
1976	6,555	1,803,825	997,487	441,180	3,242,492

Sources: Labor Statistics Yearbook, ISTAT, Rome, 1977; CGIL, CISL, UIL.

Table 2: Proxies Without Choice of Confederation. Distribution by Craft Labor Unions, 1974

Union	Total CGIL-CISL-UIL	Proxies without con- federation choice	Percent of proxies of the CGIL-CISL- UIL total
Metalworkers	951,907	220,564	23.17
Textile workers	512,560	37,700	7.35
Chemical-Oil workers	463,435	11,509	2.48
Building workers	671,838	6,022	0.89
Food workers	172,199	1,928	1.11
Local institutions and hospital workers	571,990	1,897	0.33
Business	297,604	1,538	0.51
Paperworkers and printers	130,366	846	0.64
Auto-rail-street- car workers	138,848	472	0.33

Sources: CGIL Organization Bureau.

[1 Nov 78, p 3]

[Text] Labor union presence in the two sectors of public administration and of services has a double aspect: very high in public employment and very low in the services sector. It should be borne in mind that there are many points in common between these two economic activity sectors. The transportation branch (auto-rail-streetcar workers, maritime workers, air workers, and so on) in services, and the State Railroads, in public

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administration, do not show any great disparity from the point of view of functional structure. This is so true that the CGIL has grouped them in one single federation, the FIST [Italian Federation of Transportation Unions]. The same may be said of the credit and insurance branch, a branch purely white-collar by nature, like most of the public employees. Nevertheless, the rate of unionization in many branches of public employment lines up at around 80 percent, while in the services sector, at 25 percent.

Obstacles in the Services Sector

We have already examined the factors causing the high rate of unionization among public employees. Now account should be taken of a phenomenon that is one of the most important ones in the world of labor unions. Why is the confederation labor union, so strong in public administration composed almost exclusively of white-collar workers, finding serious obstacles in service activities, a sector that is also white-collar?

In the public sphere, the confederations enjoy relationships of mediation that the parties establish between the confederations and the public workers.

Therefore, this is the framework in which the phenomenon of labor union representation is placed in the greatest variety of public agencies. In fact, as Romagnoli states, there is, in public employment, "a thick undergrowth, still unexplored, of variegated mixed commissions of bureaucrats and labor union representatives, often with combined duties of personnel management and management of the agency. A cautious estimate indicates that there are 5,000 labor union representatives within these agencies. In the private services sector, labor unionism has to contend with problems of participation and of proselytism entailed by a normal labor union practice.

At the roots of this impasse lies the superficial analysis conducted by labor unionism on the role of the middle classes in the present-day situation and the resultant attitude taken with regard to grievances and conflict behavior of these classes. Very often, in the recent past, the three labor union confederations have supported definitely corporative grievances and strikes of employees working in public administration. At the same time, the same confederations viewed the services sector with very little confidence as a sector without importance and at any rate not determinant.

The labor union situation in public employment was made more complex and difficult by the presence of autonomous labor unions and of some craft federations of the CGIL, CISL and UIL themselves. These federations are not differentiated from the above-mentioned autonomous labor unions by the kind of grievances put forth by them and at times by their own internal structure. On the other hand, they have often welcomed labor unions whose line of corporative management does not differ from that of the autonomous labor unions.

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Let us now give some figures. In 1976, there were 962,506 members in the unified federation, in the services sector, 25.8 percent of the wage-earning workers. In 1968, membership in the three labor union confederations did not exceed the 10-percent threshold. They practically did not exist prior to 1968. As has already been said, the presence of confederation labor unionism in the services sector is still very slight, weakened in addition by the instability of the relations between the craft federations in the CGIL-CISL-UIL. In fact, it is difficult to find unified meeting places owing to the small amount of uniformity between the numerous craft labor unions of the three confederations operating in this sector. However, the division into ideological spheres does not show on the outside, as often happens on the other hand in other sectors. The weakness prevailing in confederation labor unionism in the services sector and the impossibility for each of the three confederations to influence the behavior of the others, prevents excessively bitter political conflicts between the various labor union leaders working in the sector.

In order to solve the numerous problems and to cancel out the considerable lag accumulated in the services sector, the confederations are aiming at merging activity branches that have a certain degree of homogeneity. Thus, the CGIL created the FIST, the structure that coordinates the six craft federations in the transportation and communications branch. An attempt is made in this way to simplify the activity of the labor union and to unify, wherever possible, the discussion and resolution of problems common to the various craft federations. In the CISL and the UIL, the problem of mergers is being handled more cautiously, because of the different organizational structure of the two confederations.

Before going on to examine the data for public administration, I believe that it is useful to present the figures pertaining to the craft federations operating in the credit and insurance branch. The number of members is 131,324, 47.8 percent of the wage-earning workers. The leap forward with regard to 1968, the year in which the rate of unionization fluctuated around 23 percent, is considerable. The CGIL especially benefited from this increase. With its 14,000 members in 1968 it was practically nonexistent. In 1976, this confederation has 59,109 members owing to a 325-percent increase. The growth of the CISL is also good. It went from 22,707 members, in 1968, to 54,071 in 1976, with a percentage increase of 138 percent. A similar example of growth, more accurately we should speak of birth, is offered to us by the SNS [National School Union]-CGIL, which increased its membership from 3,992, in 1968, to 117,380, in 1976.

In 1976, there were 1,574,905 members of confederation unionism in the public administration sector, 63.7 percent of the total number of wage-earning workers. The rate of unionization exceeded 80 percent, if state schools, a branch forming a case of its own for various reasons, are excluded from the count. A rate of unionization rather close to 80 percent is also obtained by adding the number of members of the autonomous unions (about 250,000 members) to the number of confederation labor union members.

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The autonomous labor unions are somewhat present in every branch of public administration, especially among teachers, railroadmen and in semipublic agencies. The strength relations between the confederations are favorable to the CISL in public administration. In fact, this organization had 736,364 members in 1976, 46.8 percent of the total. The CGIL had 600,830 members (38.2 percent). The UIL had 237,711 (15 percent) members. In order to understand the importance of these figures better, it is useful to bear in mind that the CISL in public administration concentrates 29 percent of its members; the CGIL, 16.9 percent; the UIL, 22.6 percent.

Preponderance of the CISL

Therefore, the figures given emphasize the weight that the craft federations in public administration have within the CISL and, in part, within the UIL. This weight is definitely greater than the weight that the industrial labor unions have within the CGIL. From this point of view, it is proper to state that the CISL has more followers, in relative terms, among the white-collar classes than the CGIL has within the blue-collar classes. The larger number of members in the CISL among public employees enables this organization to affect the other two confederations very strongly.

The figures recorded in local institutions and insurance agencies create a certain amount of interest. Of 707,000 wage-earning workers, a good 657,864, 93.1 percent, are members of confederation labor unions. In this branch, the CGIL members (288,000) exceed, although not by much, the CISL members (270,000). This shows that the CGIL also picks up members among public workers. And they are in this branch. In fact communes administered entirely or partially by the Communist Party are becoming more and more numerous. In 1976, CGIL members among communal and hospital workers represented 50 percent of the total number of members of that organization in public administration.

The failure to prepare a consistent labor union policy of reform of public administration, a policy that will not be implemented only with words, the presence of hundreds of autonomous unions in especially critical points of our society (education) and of our economy (railroads), the state of symbiosis existing, in many cases, between labor union organizations and political parties make the labor union situation in public administration particularly confusing. Labor union practice in this sector has been affected only minimally by the profound organizational changes that occurred during the 1970's within the Italian labor union movement. On the contrary, the centrifugal thrusts within the CISL, the UIL and in some cases the CGIL, are still very strong.

The very strong tendency toward conservatism and immobility, present in various craft unions in public administration, is a very serious threat to the desire for change that inspires the Italian labor union movement on the whole, although contradictorily. An accurate analysis free from any demagogic objective is indispensable at present, in order to throw

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light on what the labor union situation is like in public administration and in order to change it.

Table 1: Wage-earning Workers (in thousands) and Labor Union members by Confederation. Services.

Year	Wage-earning workers	Union Members: Absolute Data			TOTAL
		CGIL	CISL	UIL	
1968	3,295	268,901	187,750		
1972	3,295	359,115	255,814		
1973	3,409	366,492	261,021		
1974	3,545	422,403	269,393		
1975	3,633	449,475	285,396	133,490	868,361
1976	3,735	489,860	313,070	159,576	962,506

Sources: Labor Statistics Yearbook, 1977, Rome, ISTAT. CGIL, CISL, UIL.

Table 2: Wage-earning Workers (in thousands) and Labor Union Members by Confederation. Public Administration.

Year	Wage-earning workers	Union Members: Absolute Data			TOTAL
		CGIL	CISL	UIL	
1968		253,563	446,361		
1972	2,255	391,301	587,315		
1973	2,334	444,670	604,595		
1974	2,374	481,511	633,329		
1975	2,418	564,257	678,430	174,614	1,417,301
1976	2,473	600,830	736,364	237,711	1,574,905

Sources: Italian Statistical Yearbook, 1977, ISTAT, Rome. CGIL, CISL, UIL.

[11 Nov 78, p 3]

[Text] We can estimate at about 12,000 the number of labor union officials employed full-time in the three confederations. This figure would increase to 15,000, if the union members detached from production and occupied within the company or agency in which they are employed (labor union representatives, members of the executive committee of the council of delegates) were included in the labor union apparatus. Owing to certain characteristics that I shall mention below, the close to 3,000 "detached" members within places of work cannot be regarded as true labor union officials, except by unjustified stretching of a point. Even if this last-mentioned group is excluded, Italian labor union bureaucracy is unrivaled in Europe, owing to the number of officials and owing to the ratio between them and number of members.

Thanks to the cognitive effort made by the confederations in these last 3 years, it is possible to have an already sufficiently broad picture of the labor union bureaucracy in Italy. Serious reflection has been initiated on this matter by some students of the Italian labor union movement (especially Bruno Manghi, Giuseppe Della Rocca, Filippo Battaglia), to which I shall often refer.

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There were 5,301 CGIL officials working in the 59 labor confederation councils. (Eight hundred officials working in the collateral bodies of the CGIL, charitable institutions, tourism, professional training, plus 900 more in the central and regional organizations, should be added to this figure. Therefore, altogether, the CGIL has at least 7,000 full-time officials.) Of the 5,301 officials, 1,676 form the horizontal organization (that is to say, they work in the territorial structures); the other 3,625 form the vertical organization (they work in the provincial craft federations). There were 1,032 officials with purely technical duties (typists, secretaries, and so on), 423 of whom in the horizontal organization and 609 in the vertical organization. The technical organization consists almost exclusively of women (84.5 percent). Women are an insignificant percentage in the CGIL political apparatus (6.3 percent), in which, among other things, they cover duties with slight responsibility.

The presence of women in the horizontal political apparatus is almost symbolic quantitatively (3.4 percent) and qualitatively. A similar situation, even more closed to women, is found in the CISL and UIL political organizations.

The very small number of women among the political officials is the peculiar characteristic of our labor union bureaucracy. This characteristic is quite expected, because bureaucratic structures in general leave little room for women to be represented, at least in our country. The fact that women are few in number also in the rank-and-file leadership bodies within companies in which they represent the greater part of the labor force (textile industry, food industry, trade) is less obvious. Factory councils composed 80 to 90 percent by men operate in companies employing a labor force consisting, on the average, of 60 to 70 percent women. The situation is worse when we go from the factory council to the executive committee. The federations most directly involved are reacting to this state of affairs. Some results have been obtained, especially in the CGIL, but the problem is still completely unsolved.

With regard to the ratio between the administrative machinery and the card-holding members, the figures are extremely diversified, aside from the three confederations, also for distribution of the apparatus within each confederation. If account is taken only of the political organizations, in 1976, the above-mentioned ratio was 1,011 members for each official in the CGIL, 1,206 members in the CISL (in 1974) and 789 in the UIL. Then, if the technical officials are computed also, the ratio drops to 814 for the CGIL and to 557 for the UIL. On the basis of available figures, it can be stated that the number of officials tends to increase wherever there is an unstable labor union presence and where one of the three confederations finds it difficult to operate, because it is smothered by the preponderant presence of the other ones. The confederations give us definite confirmation of that.

The UIL, the confederation with the smallest number of members, has the highest number of officials in proportion to its size (1 official for 557

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members). Naturally, it is trying to lessen the disadvantage separating it from the other organizations by ensuring space for itself also with an adequate number of officials. The CISL offers us the lowest member-apparatus ratio precisely in the "Red" regions, where the CGIL absorbs 70 percent of labor union members. In Emilia Romagna, the CISL has 1 official for every 776 members; in Tuscany, 1 for every 867. These two apparatus-member regional ratios are absolutely the lowest in the CISL.

We find a similar trend in the CGIL. In fact, this confederation is also seeking to remedy the difficult situation in the South by fattening the ranks of its organization in that area. In 1976, the CGIL had 1 official for every 745 members in the South. The CGIL apparatus in the South displays, among other things, some peculiarities in the way in which it is distributed in the various regions. For example, it is difficult to understand on what criteria the communist confederation has 1 official for every 450 members in Sicily (1 for every 226 in Palermo) and 1 official for every 1,136 members in Puglia, a region similar to Sicily with regard to labor unions, especially for the CGIL. It is likely that the introduction of a very high number of officials in the labor confederation councils in the South has given rise to some imbalance in the distribution of forces even for the very short time span in which the operation was carried out.

The present Italian labor union organization was formed in two successive phases. The first phase is tied to the establishment and expansion of company contracting in the early 1960's. This generation of officials had the task of recasting the ranks of labor union organization within the companies after the serious crisis in the 1950's. A second group of officials has come into the apparatus in this last decade to cope with the further expansion of company contracting, but especially to perform duties previous unknown, tied to the headlong increase in membership, to the constantly more complex internal organization and to the institutional role won by the labor union movement. This second influx has taken on unanticipated dimensions. By way of example, it suffices to point out that, in 1970, the CGIL had 3,647 full-time officials (an already considerable figure) for the confederation labor councils, while 6 years later, in 1976, there were 5,301 officials. In this period, 1,654 new officials came in. This figure does not include new officials who came into the apparatus with normal turnover. A similar situation is observed in the UIL and partially in the CISL.

The expansion of labor union organizations in these 10 years shows no solution of continuity with the past. In fact, while rank-and-file labor union structures within the companies are composed of delegates elected by the votes of the workers, there is nothing similar for the apparatus outside places of work. In fact, the principle instrument for recruiting new officials is cooptation, while the election of leadership groups during the congresses is tied to the distribution of posts among the various political parties. Thus, the leadership groups have prevented

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labor union bureaucracy from undergoing too sudden changes, guaranteeing, at the same time, internal compactness of the structures.

The circumspection in selecting officials and the cautiousness with which organizational innovation was carried out in the structures outside places of work demonstrate confederation leadership's adaptability capability in the period from 1968 to 1972, during the most critical years in recent labor union history.

As Bruno Manghi maintained, precisely at the end of that period (during a debate that took place in 1972 on labor union executive personnel in the CGIL periodical QUADERNI DI RASSEGNA SINDACALE), "the change has been, to a large part, a phenomenon of adaptation, an attempt by a type of leader to respond to various pressures, to new problems that had to be solved. This has not yet meant a physical replacement of leaders (there is a 90-percent permanency in the leadership group, even in the more sought after places in the labor union movement), but it has not even meant a radical, firm change in the way of thinking, of acting and of behaving by these leaders in political activity."

Naturally, in this period, thanks primarily to the action taken by individual leaders or by small very united groups, there have been profound changes in the structure. It suffices to think of the role performed at the rank-and-file level of the CISL and within its leadership group by the FIM (metalworkers) executives who emerged during the 1968-1972 worker struggles. Their influence, however, was limited and rarely went beyond the limits of certain craft federations in industry.

If there has been change within the labor union structures, it has occurred sporadically and, especially, it has never affected the decision-making mechanisms and selection criteria.

[Table on next page]

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Labor Union Confederation (CGIL, CISL, UIL): Membership, Vertical and Horizontal Structural Apparatus on Provincial Level, Membership-Apparatus Ratio. 1976.

Geo-graphic areas	Members		Full-time political officials		Number of members per full-time political official				
	CGIL	CISL* UIL	CGIL	CISL* UIL	CGIL	CISL* UIL			
N. Italy	2,392,773	1,278,767	480,639	2,287	1,161	613	1,046	1,101	784
Cent. Italy	920,032	389,508	200,939	769	402	385	1,197	969	522
S. Italy	1,003,312	804,426	423,310	1,213	486	402	826	1,655	1,053
Tot. Italy	4,316,699	2,472,701	1,104,888	4,269	2,049	1,400	1,011	1,206	789
Technical officials				1,032	--	582			
Total Apparatus (political + technical)				5,301	2,049	1,982			

SOURCE: CGIL, CISL, UIL.

The figures do not include either the regional and national structural organizations (confederation and craft) or the organization of collateral institutions (charitable institutions, tourism, professional training).

*The data are for 1974.

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SPAIN

PNV PRESIDENT DISCUSSES BASQUE PERSPECTIVE ON CONSTITUTION

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 12 Nov 78 p 33

[Text] It is not easy to explain our view of the constitutional text, or rather, it is not simple to express from a Basque nationalist perspective an opinion that requires large amounts of understanding toward a cause that does not enjoy too much popularity among so many readers, especially since the recent attacks upon our statements in this and other publications. Nevertheless, only by speaking can people make themselves understood, and I shall not be one to pass up this opportunity to explain our point of view off the top of my head.

What is the attitude of Basque nationalists of the PNV [Basque Nationalist Party] toward this or any other constitution that may be drafted in the Spanish state? Very simple. Our specific and fundamental objective is to promote the cause of a people, the Basque people, which is suffering one of the most serious moments in its history. Lacking the political power resources indispensable for the protection and development of their own national identity, our people are facing one of the most disturbing prospects that can present itself to any people--their disappearance from the map as a distinct community. This explains the appearance of radicalness and exasperation that Basque nationalism sometimes assumes in its various sectors. A people that sees its language, its culture, its economy, its environment, its very identity being destroyed without a single constitutional resource to ensure its coexistence finds it difficult to wait calmly for a more promising future...



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In this situation our position is to obtain enough political power for Euzkadi to put an end to this state of affairs and guarantee the future development of the Basque nation.

We are opposed to the establishment of relations of interdependence and solidarity with the other peoples of the state, to whom we are joined by close feelings and affinities. Quite the contrary. But we do impose a dual requirement, and it is that the state model on which these relations be established should respect two principles--the principle of the pre-existence of some peoples endowed with their own original political power, on voluntary union with which the state is established, with the obligation of recognizing and respecting such a principle; and the consensual relationship between the representatives of the central authority and those of those territories in order to work out, once and for all, the distribution of jurisdictions and respective spheres of operation. This should be done in such a way as to resolve that historical controversy in which the Basques, at least, feel embroiled since the despoiling of their "fueros" in the last century, with the consequent resistance at feeling incorporated in the state models that the Spanish constituent process has been establishing.

Reality, as Euzkadi sees it, is what it is, not what more than one wants to imagine it. Euzkadi struggles between the complete political frustration that leads to independentism and the hope of those who still believe that it is possible to devise a state model in which the nationalities can survive and develop satisfactorily. Our constitutional position would be to find an acceptable solution for the great majority of the sectors of public opinion of this people through a specific constitutional resolution of the Basque case, not even requiring the generalizing of a federal establishment of the state. I believe that the majority political parties have displayed complete blindness in rejecting a solution which in my opinion settled an old controversy in the best possible way. It might not be the most desirable formula to some people, but it solved a serious state problem, which, whether we like it or not, is not going to find lower-cost solutions for centralistic and uniformistic minds.

Therefore, without anger, with the firm determination to continue to operate in the strictest legality, and always championing political, civilized courses of action, we are not going to be able to embrace this constitution.

We recognize and proclaim its general good points, its improvement over the past, and even the progressivist quality that it has in a good part of its text. And I shall not go into an analysis of its general content, which I am sure will be amply commented upon by friends in other parties, with whom I shall in large part agree, to be sure. But as Basque nationalists we cannot accept a concept whereby the state is the beginning and the end of our existence. On the contrary, we shall always claim that the peoples who comprise it, from their very political being, form the basis for and give the state its reason for being. To us it is not just a matter of principles, but also a practical matter that guarantees profundity in autonomic concept and immutability of the same without the consent of our people.

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SPAIN

CATALAN VIEWPOINT ON CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 12 Nov 78 p 37

/Article by Jordi Pujol Soley: "The Constitution is Positive"/

/Text/ With the approval of the constitutional text which has emerged from legislative discussion, a new phase in Spanish political life will be initiated. The Constitution means a break with the past and the starting point for the effective exercise of democratic coexistence of all citizens, which we hope will be long-lasting and definitive. The text can and must be considered in its positive entirety.

Actually, it means a break with the past because it outlines a democratic system and when it is approved, all existing basic legislation must be changed and adapted to the innovations introduced within the constitutional framework. The remnants of the legislation and institutions of totalitarian type must cease to exist at all levels and must be adapted to the new juridical order established.

In great part, the importance of the constitutional text is derived from the way in which its preparation has been effected. The widely heralded, but to our understanding, positive, consensus, has allowed a text to emerge with whose content it can be said the great majority of citizens agree. The Constitutional referendum should soon ratify that which has been prepared by the representatives elected by the people on 15 June. These basic norms, on which there is agreement in principle among the majority groups and ideologies of the country, should allow a final consolidation of democracy through their strict application. The Constitution thus written offers enough safeguards to achieve a peaceful and democratic coexistence of the Spanish people; a democratic coexistence in freedom because it is not in vain that the text contains a detailed list of human rights and public freedoms whose exercise and application shall be insured and protected by the public powers. However, the constitutional text not only insures that final possibility of a democratic coexistence in freedom, but also the possibility that with its application some democratic institutions will be consolidated, which shall place us on an equal plane with the West European systems with long democratic traditions.

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A careful analysis of its content ostensibly tilts the scales toward the positive aspects. The agreement on the political form of the state, configured consensually as a parliamentary monarchy, can definitively close the breaches of old antagonisms.

From our point of view, the importance of the text is determined by the specific treatment of the right to autonomy of the nationalities and regions of the state. It has been said--and not without reason--that this is the constitution of autonomies. It may be true. The text which has emerged from the discussions of the Congress of Deputies allows the nationalities and regions to give themselves institutions of self-government with a real and sufficient autonomous content.

It is also true, however, that some trimming of the authority of the autonomous communities in certain matters, which for Catalonia are of great importance, has been introduced in the Senate discussions.

Undoubtedly, however, the autonomous communities can attain levels of autonomy much higher than any they ever attained before. It is obvious--from our point of view--that the text could be much better. It would have been desirable if some responsibilities on basic matters such as the tax system would have adopted another aspect and at least a broader scope in their content. However, overall, the treatment and regulation of the authority of the autonomous communities is positive and allows, at least from our Catalanian perspective, an important degree of autonomy.

The Constitution is, all in all, of a progressive nature. In this respect it introduces legal and political institutions of a markedly advanced nature. The figure of the "ombudsman," the abolishment of the death penalty, the possibility of a divorce regulation, the attainment of adulthood at 18 years-of-age, the institution of the jury, the broad and detailed list of human rights and public freedoms, the recognition of the historic rights of the legal territories--the writing of which could have been improved--added, as

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is obvious, to those of the institutions of every democratic state and its operations, make of it a modern and progressive text capable of making possible in definitive form the true democratic coexistence in freedom of all Spanish citizens and communities.

It seems to me, however, that it is necessary to make one final observation, which I have already made in the Congress of Deputies. The best, the most enlightened, the most advanced constitution fails if the political habits of the country are bad, if the political parties are not strong and well-structured, if the unions and business organizations are not well-rooted and do not have a high sense of responsibility. A constitution, no matter how good it is, is not a panacea: it is only a framework, or if you wish, a tool with which one must work. In our opinion the tool is good. It is up to everyone to use it well.

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WEST GERMANY

PUBLIC EMPLOYEES UNION HEAD INTERVIEWED ON DEMANDS

Hamburg STERN in German 11 Jan 79 pp 88-92

[Interview with Heinz Kluncker, president of the OTV: "Unions—"We Are Not the Government's Coalition Partners""]

[Text] STERN spoke with the president of the OTV [Public Service, Transportation and Traffic Trade Union] Heinz Kluncker, about wage demands, vacations and shortened work hours for sanitation men, policemen, firemen and hospital employees.

STERN: Mr Kluncker, if your recommendations are followed, the OTV in the March contract negotiations will demand wage and salary increases of 6.5 percent and an increase in the vacation compensation by 250 marks to a uniform level of 400 marks. However, the union's position is already being criticized for lacking a social component.

Kluncker: The demand for an increase in the vacation compensation is, after all, also a social component. One who takes this demand seriously cannot squander it.

STERN: In five rounds of contract negotiations since 1971 you have pushed through wage floors for the lower wage earners, or a minimum wage. A communal worker in the lowest classification earning at this time 1,428.49 marks would receive only a 58 mark increase in the event of a realistic contract increase of 4 percent, but almost double that with a 100 mark basic increase.

Kluncker: First of all, I would not like to share your estimate of 4 percent. In 1979 generally no more can be done for the public service than for employees and workers of private industry--except at the price of private enterprises being drawn into the areas in which many employees of the lowest salary classes are working. These salary classes include mainly cleaning ladies or the most simple activities. And it is precisely their salaries that are much lower in private cleaning businesses than in the public service.

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STERN: According to estimates by OTV officials, however, it is possible that this recommended demand of your presidium will be rejected in the contract commission on 21 February and that a minimum increase of 120 to 140 marks will be demanded.

Kluncker: If you show me a wage demand of IG Metall that is based on an increase of 120 to 140 marks for everybody, then I will be ready to re-think this issue.

STERN: But must you not, after all, take into account that within your union, just as within the IG Metall, there exists a certain alienation between the management and the membership?

Kluncker: I would decidedly question an alienation within IG Metall. I see that the strike front is standing firm. And the leadership of IG Metall has even broadened the strike front. By the way, I am of the opinion that it is no national disaster when members correct recommended demands.

STERN: Can you achieve good results in this round of contract negotiations without strike action?

Kluncker: I would not like to threaten strike action at this time. For me it is always a means of resolving conflict, not the conflict itself. Neither have final wage demands been fixed nor negotiations started. And as long as the latter have not failed, I am convinced that one should not enter the fray with precipitate action. If it is necessary, there will be a strike, and one that will be felt.

STERN: You once said that "a union without a strike is like a grandmother without teeth."

Kluncker: I have nothing to add to that.

STERN: Will your demand be met with understanding by the public considering the increasing national debt and the growing criticism of the efficiency of public services?

Kluncker: It will be our task to make the public aware that employees of public services perform well for the citizen and thus have a justified claim to just compensation. We cannot demand that they waive their salaries just because the financial policies are the way they are.

STERN: It is certain that there will be renewed criticism of public services during this round of wage negotiations.

Kluncker: Who are the critics? Such groupings as the "League of Taxpayers" or the businessmen? Also, public employers sometimes feel that criticism

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of public services strengthens their negotiating position. That is why they play dead, instead of taking a stand for the public service employee more often.

STERN: A critic is, for example, the man on the street who has to wait 3 or 4 hours to get his car registered at the motor vehicles bureau.

Kluncker: If I made as much of a furor over every complaint in the private sector as the critics of the public services do, then by such talk I would create an image of our economy that does not exist in reality. Just take a look at the fine print of the sales contracts; just watch out when you have claims on your insurance policy. Only in the public service are human errors dramatized. Opposed to this is the dream picture of the service achievements of the so-called free enterprise system.

STERN: Did we hear correctly--the "so-called free enterprise system?"

Kluncker: The existence of cartels and monopolies is, after all, not in harmony with the idealized image of our economy. I consider the market economy a useful instrument. But I do not idealize it to a degree that is not a true reflection of reality.

STERN: At this time you are not looking for shorter workweeks. Do you consider the 35-hour week to be a useful instrument for the elimination of unemployment? Do you think it conceivable that your membership will still push for this demand?

Kluncker: Conceivable yes, realistic no. The work tenure regulations of the public services have been fixed by framework agreements until 1980. Only when a 6-week vacation has been agreed upon for all employees will we put greater pressure behind the question of the length of the workweek. I consider it a matter of course that the 35-hour week will one day be introduced in the public service as well, and for humanitarian reasons.

STERN: Strike actions seem to become more embittered. If the employers continue to persist in lockouts, as has again been the case in the steel industry, will you as a DGB Presidium member say that solidarity strikes by other DGB unions are possible?

Kluncker: You will understand that I do not like to talk about this. Not that I am too cowardly to commit myself. I consider the lockout to indeed be an arbitrary step; the imbalance between capital and labor that exists anyway will become worse due to the lockout. This is indeed class struggle from above. The struggle against this position is not only the affair of the union that happens to be involved in the specific dispute. All DGB unions are concerned in this matter.

STERN: Thus you do not exclude the possibility of sympathy strikes?

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Kluncker: I would prefer not to comment on this. But we will not abandon our colleagues.

STERN: Is a lockout in the public services thinkable?

Kluncker: If the provincial finance ministries decreed a closure of the internal revenue offices, then all kinds of interesting effects would be certain. But I envision a lockout in a hospital to be just as impossible as strikes in the health field, fire fighting or police, which we have never called. The Federal Republic just happens to be one of the least strike-prone countries--but also one of the most lockout-enthusiastic. This is also characteristic of the mentality of the German businessman. That is a class in itself.

STERN: Mr Kluncker, you and the leading unionists are Social Democrats. The unions and the SPD are again drawing closer together. Are we heading toward a union state?

Kluncker: This solidarity is not a new development. Besides, today there are even Christian Democrats to whom the positions of the unions are more relevant than the signals of the industry associations.

STERN: Mr Bluem, for example?

Kluncker: Not only he, but he, too. And it is a pleasure to hear such voices from time to time. The blabber about a union state is not new, but the danger is not at all relevant. Unions do not want to be either ersatz parties or shadow governments. They cannot become the third or the nth coalition partner. They must maintain a critical distance from all ruling powers of the state and society. But as a rule the unions receive greater support from the Social Democratic Party.

STERN: But the SPD has another coalition partner.

Kluncker: My relationship with the FDP is unbroken. But it is more difficult to get a clear understanding with the various wings of the FDP than with those of the SPD.

STERN: Do you prefer to negotiate with Mr Baum, the federal minister of the interior, rather than with Count Lambsdorff, the minister of economics?

Kluncker: I don't know. To me the count is not a negative symbol. Only his statements sometimes reveal class conscious interests. Ministers just happen to be difficult sometimes. But we don't choose them, we just take them as given quantities.

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